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The connection between French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and Italian political
theorist Antonio Negri has drawn attention in academic publications over the last decade.
For both thinkers, the philosophical concept of immanence is central to how both
respectively conceptualize the world. However, in order to consider their work with
regard to a metaphysical grounding, one may benefit from turning to each thinker’s
engagement with Jewish Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza whose immanent ontology,
or monism, was indeed his Ethics. This essay concentrates on drawing out an ontological
distinction between the philosophical projects of Deleuze and Negri by way of a close
reading of their interpretation of Spinoza’s work. It is through Deleuze's and Negri’s
respective readings of Spinoza that we can contrast the two in terms of their ontologies,
which, in the end, is ultimately a discussion of modality, of ethics, and of positive limits.
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“Nobody can desire to be happy, to do well, and to live without at the same time desiring
to be to do and to live; that is, actually to exist” (Political Treatise P21).

1. Introduction

In his conversation with Cesare Casarino, Italian political philosopher Antonio
Negri proclaims—not for the first time—his intellectual friendship with
French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. Indeed, how important Deleuze has been for the
development of Negri's own political philosophy is already apparent from the latter's
book on Spinoza, Savage Anomaly, in which he writes that “without Deleuze's work,
[his] work [on Spinoza] would have been impossible” (267). However, Negri considers
his relationship with Deleuze “an encounter with continuity” (Casarino 117) rather than
one of filiation. Here, Negri distances himself from any encounter with Deleuze based on
fidelity to Deleuze’s work; instead, he claims the significance of the intersections in their
respective projects. Even while rooted in different intellectual traditions, the intersections
identify strong resonances of Deleuze's philosophy in Negri's own project. These
resonances are composed, as Negri refers to in the above, in tension as opposed to
filiation. Even so, Deleuze remains Negri's most “privileged interlocutor among
contemporary thinkers” (118)—his influence second only to Marx.
In Negri's recent collaborations with Michael Hardt—especially in the “Empire”
trilogy consisting of Empire, Multitude, and Commonwealth—the influence of Deleuze is
indicated early on; the preface to Empire cites Deleuze and Félix Guattari's A Thousand
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Plateaus as well as Marx's Grudrisse as primary methodological models for their
project (xvi). Thus, recent scholarly work underscores their association as well as
analyzes and differentiates their respective positions. It may be prudent to begin further
investigation by turning to a conversation between Negri and Deleuze in order to draw
out what may be at stake in terms of where their work meets and where it diverges. In a
conversation between the two, Negri presses Deleuze to define his position regarding the
political consequences for a subject whose boundary is dispersive—a continuous
movement between an inside and outside. For Negri, the forces Deleuze defines later in
the exchange as “lines of flight,” which offer a means of escape to methods of control,
are still subject to production of sameness—turning one subject into the other and vice
versa. Deleuze’s emphasis is on movement—the act that brings about creation—rather
than on form. Negri questions Deleuze further: in such a conception, he asks, what force
and life can be given to citizenship? Moreover:
What politics can carry into history the splendor of events and
subjectivity? How can we conceive a community that has real force but no
base, that isn't a totality but is, as in Spinoza, absolute? [...] Is there then,
some way for the resistance of the oppressed to become effective, and for
what's intolerable to be definitively removed? Is there some way for the
mass of singularities and atoms that we all are to come forward as a
constitutive power, or must we rather accept the juridical paradox that
constitutive power can be defined only by constituted power? (“Control
and Becoming”)
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To this, Deleuze concedes it is important to consider the different ways that individuals
constitute themselves as subjects. However, he emphasizes that rather than thinking of
the process of subjectification, we might think instead of new kinds of events (“Control
and Becoming”). These events come about only for a moment and insist on movement;
this continuous two-way movement between inside and outside is creation—creation of
new ways of thinking. Negri argues that there must be a way for the subjectivities—the
dispersive forces—to act collectively; a collective force requires a mechanism that allows
for singular forces to remain singular while coming together as collective being. Deleuze
challenges Negri’s notion of the collective as a goal to achieve, which has the power to
subject and homogenize. For Deleuze, “What we most lack is a belief in the world ... if
you believe in the world, you precipitate events” (“Control and Becoming”). However
small their surface or volume, these events, Deleuze argues, engender new space-time
(“Control and Becoming”). Belief is the link between humans and the world, as a
manifestation of power. It is the act of belief that opens to creation, new pathways, and
lines of flight.
In his reply, he goes on to challenge Negri further on the notion of a mass of
singularities coming forward as a constitutive power:
The difference between minorities and majorities isn't their size. A
minority may be bigger than a majority. What defines the majority is a
model you have to conform to: the average European adult male citydweller, for example ... A minority, on the other hand, has no model, it’s a
becoming, a process. One might say the majority is nobody. Everybody’s
caught, one way or another, in a minority becoming that would lead them
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into unknown paths if they opted to follow it through. When a ‘minority’
creates models for itself, it’s because it wants to become a majority, and
probably has to, to survive or prosper (to have a state, be recognized,
establish its rights, for example). But its power comes from what it’s
managed to create, which to some extent goes into the model, but doesn’t
depend on it. (“Control and Becoming”).
Becoming requires a belief in the world—the act of affirming a new pathway or line of
flight—in order to evade control. The forward movement of belief is not lost on Negri,
but central for him is constituent power—control cannot just be evaded, rather freedom
must be instituted. At stake for Negri’s theoretical operation is the mechanism that allows
singularities to come together in order for the oppressed to become effective. His
philosophical project, his life, is inextricably linked to political praxis. Thus, this
exchange draws out a crucial tension between Deleuze and Negri: both employ what
Negri refers to as the “optimism of reason” (Goodbye Mr. Socialism 23), which is a
philosophy of the affirmative—in opposition to the negation that runs Hegelian dialectics.
However, both thinkers utilize the affirmative in different ways, which leads to the
tension sustained in their conversation above. How they conceive of the force of life with
respect to the concept of the affirmative can perhaps be seen most clearly in their
respective encounters with the 17th century Dutch Jewish philosopher, Baruch Spinoza.
Deleuze has described Spinoza as belonging to a “counter-history” of philosophy;
while he is certainly recognized in the history of philosophy, his work also escapes it
(Dialogues 15). Both Deleuze and Negri are interested in Spinoza for the counter or
alternative lineage of his philosophy. Spinoza’s work suggests an affirmative alternative
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practice, and for Negri, Spinoza gives us an effective ‘other’ to Power (Savage
Anamoly xvii). It is the affirmative that draws out the force of power (potentia), or
empowerment, as distinguished from Power (potestas), which is the capture of that force.
Through a clear emphasis on potentia, rather than its captor potestas, both thinkers work
to draw out the immanence of life, as an ontological foundation, which to them is
opposed to the illusion of transcendence.
In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze speaks of understanding Spinoza “by
way of the middle” (122). The first principle for Spinoza is that there is one substance for
all the attributes, but for Deleuze the inversion of this is “no longer the affirmation of a
single substance, but rather the laying out of a common plane of immanence on which all
bodies, all minds, and all individuals are situated” (122).1 Thus, it is from this premise
that we begin by considering Spinoza’s Ethics through examining the movements of life
without any notions of transcendence.
I began this essay by revisiting the conversation between Deleuze and Negri as a
means to accentuate a crucial difference in their theoretical projects—a difference that, in
the end, pertains to their conception of ontology. In the following, I will proceed to
explicate the ways in which Negri’s reading of Spinoza in Savage Anomaly departs in
subtle yet telling ways from Deleuze’s in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. More
precisely, I will try to unearth the ontological differences between the two by examining

1

Substance, the attributes, and modes are how Spinoza presents the world. There is only
one substance for the attributes. Every mode must be conceived through the attributes,
which are expressed both physically—referred to as extension—and in thought or ideas.
Attributes, specifically, will not be a central component of my analysis, especially given
that Negri argues that in the end, the attributes were phased out of the Ethics.
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how each interprets and deploys the Spinozian concept of striving or conatus.
Ultimately, my analysis will tease out how the notion of ethics in their respective work is
bound by ontology: to do ontology is to do ethics, as I will show. And in order to explain
the different ethical implications of their work on Spinoza, it will prove necessary to
distinguish Negri and Deleuze in terms of their understanding of the affirmative, which
will, in the end, turn out to be a matter of contrasting positive limits.

2. What a Body Can Do

Deleuze devotes an entire chapter in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza to
Spinoza’s claim that “no one has yet determined what a body can do… For no one has
yet come to know the structure of a body so accurately that he could explain all of its
functions” (Ethics III P2). As a thinker of the affirmative par excellence, perhaps it is not
surprising that Deleuze is rapt with a question pregnant with potential. It seems that such
a claim goes against any conception of ethics based on a top down governing morality;
rather, it draws attention to human potential—or, for Deleuze, potential tout court—as
the central focus of life. Spinoza’s Ethics presents a geometrical theorem that shows
human passions are not exempt from natural or physical laws. As such, ethics are not
dictated in moral imperatives given by transcendent Being, but rather an ontology that
places ‘the ought’ of ethics in the middle of immanent reality. The world is absolute; it
exists without an end purpose and humans without a will or immortal soul. In his
interpretation of Spinoza’s work, Deleuze emphasizes the immanent quality of the
material world—God as the real, active, and actual substance of the world—as the source
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of power. In a world of surfaces, or in Spinozian terms, a world where there is only one
substance, the relational nature of the world comes to the fore—a process animated by
the affirmative (“The Politics of Affect: Spinoza in the Work of Negri and Deleuze” 25).
For Deleuze, when Spinoza says we do not even know what a body can do, he issues a
serious challenge to hierarchy, to transcendence offering an assertion of power, an
assertion of affirmation, which is critical to the internal mechanism of his ontology. In
order to examine the claim of what a body can do, I will attempt to draw out Deleuze’s
interpretation of the affirmative as a process of intensification. Exploring the immanent,
relational, and affective quality of the Spinozian assertion will allow us to move the
analysis closer to an understanding of the ontology of Deleuze’s operation.
Spinoza’s conception of immanence reorients the structures of power and puts all
on the same level and relational playing field. While this horizon dismisses the illusions
of transcendence, the radical potential of Spinoza’s work is affective. That is, the
constitutive power of the affects is also the power physically to change the world. The
affects emphasize the constructive and relational nature of Spinoza’s ontology (24).
Throughout Spinoza’s theorem, he shows that a body is a particular thing—that it
is “distinguished reciprocally with respect to motion or rest” (Ethics II P13 Proof). Thus,
a body is a temporarily stable composition of parts, but this composition can never be
conceived outside of its relational nature. The internal composition of a body relies on the
power to be affected, rather than to act, as Deleuze holds: “A body’s structure is the
composition of its relation. What a body can do is the nature and the limits of its power to
be affected” (Expressionism in Philosophy 92). The complex interplay of relations
designates a body as inseparable from its capacity to be affected—from its relational

8
nature—and this capacity for being affected, Deleuze explains, is “constantly and
necessarily filled by affections that realize it” (Practical Philosophy 97). Deleuze is
invested in this instance where power presents itself in existence. This is not to say that
Deleuze is seeking to show the physical nature of the world as privileged materiality, nor
does he wish to elevate thought; rather, for Deleuze both are equal attributes of substance.
Substance expresses itself immediately through being, or what Spinoza calls
modes. Deleuze investigates what a body can do in terms of modality; a mode has an
essence, which is a degree of power. The degree of power can be thought of as the
capacity to be affected. A mode is not exterior; it does not exist outside of anything, but
rather it possesses a great number of parts (Expressionism in Philosophy 217). Even so, a
mode only has these parts because of its capacity to be affected, which is why “extensive
parts do not belong to a given mode except in a certain relation” (217).
In the context of immanence, the modal reality of the world stems from one
substance, as Spinoza shows us that power, as essence, “is part of the infinite power of
God or Nature” (Ethics IV P4). All is in God and God is the cause of all affections—all
modal essences and existing modes. Modes, first and foremost, are the active affections
of substance. However, a mode is always in composition with other modes, as the modes,
which are a degree of power, are defined by the capacity to be affected and their
expression—that is, they are at once affected and expressive. Moreover, the capacity to
be affected is a constant, and a mode ceases to exist when it cannot be affected in many
ways (Expressionism in Philosophy 218). Modes are themselves active affections, but
they are also in compositions with external forces. In order to consider the dynamics of
this operation, we still must gain more clarity around the role of the affections.
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3. The Affects

Deleuze interprets the modes as a modal triad, in that the essence is “a degree of
power, a certain capacity to be affected in which it expresses itself, and the affections
that, each moment, exercise that capacity” (217). Before moving forward, we must make
an important distinction regarding affections: Deleuze tells us it would be wrong to
confuse affections with suffering or passions, as an “affection is not a passion, except
when it cannot be explained by the nature of the affected body” (218). Active affections
are those that can only be explained by the nature of the affected body; the capacity for
active affections must derive from an internal rather than external cause. Therefore, since
there is nothing external to Nature, it is necessarily the cause of all things—Nature or
God is pure action. In contrast, external forces constantly affect the modes. This
highlights another critical point: God’s affections are themselves modes, which reiterates
an earlier point—modes are the active affections of substance—whereas the affections of
modes are a second degree of affection—the affections of affections. Spinoza shows that
“the force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by
the power of external causes” (Ethics IV P3). Thus, our limitation is linked to external
causes; our capacity to produce active affections faces the interference of externality at a
constant.
The secondary or external nature of these affections is passive, in that we
experience and express, rather than produce, the effect of some other body on our own
(Expressionism in Philosophy 219). This allows us to return to the above distinction
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regarding passions, as these passive affections are the affects we experience, those
which continually affect us, and that we express. In Practical Philosophy, Deleuze
distinguishes this as a second level where “the affections designate that which happens to
the mode, the modifications of the mode, the effects of other modes on it” (48). A mode
can be modified, and the effects on the mode also leave a trace of the affecting mode.
“These affections of the human body whose ideas present external bodies as present in
us, we shall call images of things… And when the mind regards bodies in this way, we
shall say it imagines” (Ethics II P16). The image is the trace in the modified body. What
Deleuze is careful to specify is the difference between what he calls the image affections
or ideas (affectio) and the feeling affects (affectus), as this allows him to explain both the
durative and existential function of the affects. While affectus corresponds to duration—
that is, passing to a greater or lesser perfection, affectio refers to the “state of an affected
body and implies the presence of the affecting body” (Practical Philosophy 49).
Thus, the passage: we move from one image to another, and in doing so, we pass
from greater or lesser states of perfection than the preceding state in which we were
composed. We must not think of this movement as isolated, but rather as a continuous
relational movement, which occurs between extensive parts. On this level, the modes are
affected by an external cause that agrees in nature, which increases its power of acting, or
it comes into contact with those that do not agree with its nature and diminishes its power
of acting. These affects are passions of the mind, which are confused ideas that the mind
affirms of its body, as “a greater or lesser force of existing than before” (Ethics III, gen.
def. of the affects). Importantly, this is not a comparison, but consciousness as a reality:
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When I say a greater or lesser force of existing than before, I do not
understand that the mind compares its body’s present constitution with a
past constitution, but that the idea which constitutes the form of the affect
affirms of the body something which really involves more or less reality
than before. (III gen. def. of the affects)
Even still, such affects are passions so long as we are not their adequate cause. As such,
even affects defined by the increase in our power of acting are still passions, as long as
our “power of acting is not increased to the point where he conceives himself and his
actions adequately” (Ethics IV P59, dem.).
What a body can do is imbedded in the affections; the capacity to be affected
provides us with an opening to intensify our power, which is a matter of organizing our
encounters based on increasing our action. Thus, Deleuze’s own rendering of the
Spinozian question becomes “we do not even know of what affections we are capable,
nor the extent of our power. How could we know this in advance?” (Expressionism in
Philosophy 226). However, if active affections only arise from the affected body and
simple bodies are continually affected by the secondary, external, and passive affections,
we are still cut off from experiencing active affections.
In order to better understand the function of the affects, Deleuze distinguishes
between the capacity to be affected and the ability to be affected, as that which sets apart
active and passive affections:
Just as the capacity for being affected (postestas) corresponds to the
essence of God as power (potentia), an ability (aptus) to be affected
corresponds to the essence of the existing mode as a degree of power
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(conatus). This is why the conatus, in a second determination, is a
tendency to maintain and maximize the ability to be affected. (Practical
Philosophy 99)
As we saw in the case of substance, the capacity to be affected is filled with the active
affections—substance is driven by its own perfection, as immanent cause. However, with
existing modes, the ability to be affected is determined by affections (affectio) and affects
(affectus), which are produced by way of the imagination and passions (99). With an
existing mode, conatus cannot be severed from the affections experienced by the mode
each moment (Expressionism in Philosophy 231). The relational nature of essence is
described first by the example of substance, as in modes that affirm and maintain
existence, as Michael Hardt explains (Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy
68). The tendency of conatus is not a tendency to pass into existence, but to maintain and
affirm existence (Practical Philosophy 99, emphasis mine); as a mode, power is increased
or diminished based on encounters with external forces.

4. Conatus as the Affirmative

We have come to understand to some degree the operative reality of the world, as
we see movement in terms of composition and affection, but we lack specific knowledge
of the force behind the movement. A mode passing into existence entails an infinity of
extensive parts, which are determined from without to come under the relations
corresponding to its essence or its degree of power (Expressionism in Philosophy 229).
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This essence, then, is itself determined as conatus or appetite (Ethics III, 7). The
conatus is what all bodies possess; a modal existence is a physical reality, which lacks
nothing, and preserves and strives to contain under its relation an infinity of extensive
parts. Hardt asserts that for Deleuze, “conatus is the physical instantiation of the
ontological principle of power” (Gilles Deleuze 93). That is, at once, conatus is the
essence and motor force of productive being, and it is driven not only by sensibility but
also by passions (93).
The essence, as a degree of power, is both part of infinite power and a degree of
intensity. This is not to say the intensity of essence is the same for each thing; rather,
each thing has a tendency to affirm existence. Importantly, Deleuze shows that conatus is
not the effort to persevere in existence, once existence is granted, but that “a mode comes
to exist when its extensive parts are extrinsically determined to enter into the relation that
characterizes the mode: then, and only then is its essence itself determined as conatus”
(Expressionism in Philosophy 230). Conatus allocates the existential function of
essence—the affirmation of essence in a mode's existence. Conatus, as the internal
process, links essence to action—to existence. Essence must exist. How can we say that
finite modes have more reality than infinite God or that the world lacks anything? Thus,
modal essences are all that they are: they lack nothing, and conatus, as the affirmative
force, determines their existential function. As such, Deleuze highlights the intersection
where power presents itself in existence:
For everything depends on and derives from an affirmative conception of
essence: the degree of power as an affirmation of essence in God; the
conatus as an affirmation of essence in existence; the relation of motion
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and rest or the capacity for being affected as a maximum position and a
minimum position; the variations of power of acting or force of existing
within these positive limits. (Practical Philosophy 102)
The conatus of an existing mode is entwined with the affections experienced in
each moment. It is, thus, the affections that determine conatus and are a cause of
consciousness: “the conatus having become conscious of itself under this or that affect is
called desire, desire always being a desire for something” (Practical Philosophy 99).
When our ability to be affected is employed by passions, conatus is determined by
passion, but affections as cause of consciousness allow us to “distinguish what
determines us, and that to which we are determined” (Expressionism in Philosophy 231).
The stronger the affection constituting our composition, the greater our desire to affirm or
maintain in existence, as even passive affections involve a degree of power, albeit quite
low (231). Thus, conatus, being our effort to persevere in existence, is always a quest for
what is useful or good for us; “it always involves some degree of our power of action”
(240). Thus, striving, the tendency of conatus, is the effort to experience joy, to augment
power:
The more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, i.e., to
preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue; conversely,
insofar as each one neglects his own advantage, i.e., neglects to preserve
his being, he lacks power. (Ethics IV P20)
Conatus shows us the theory of dynamism without finalism—“a dynamism through
which essence asserts itself in existence, espousing the variations of the power of action”
(Expressionism in Philosophy 232). The affirmation of our power determines the positive
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limits of existence. Through the affirmative, we can strive to unite with what increases
our powers of acting, to become conscious of the kind of affections that determine our
conatus.

5. The Second Foundation

Michael Hardt states that Deleuze's early work brings us a philosophical critique
of dialectical thinking, one that Negri accompanies with a political critique of
Hegeliansim (The Art of Organization). Though the focus of this essay is not to highlight
the opposition to the dialectic in the analysis, the point, dialectics aside, is to make plain
the political nature of Negri's work, as for Negri to say philosophy is to say politics.
Accused for his affiliation in the murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo
Moro, Negri’s supposed involvement with the leftist group the Red Brigade implicated
him on a variety of charges. Following his imprisonment, Savage Anomaly was famously
drafted by “the light of midnight oil, in stolen moments stripped away from the daily
routine” (Savage Anomaly xxiii) of prison life.2 While Negri does not lead into his
encounter with Spinoza through touching on the controversy and uncertainty he faces, its
weight is certainly felt in the text. He undertakes the study of Spinoza in a place that
“dissolves time” as the “principle form of punishment in a capitalist society” (xxiii) and
hopes that the discomfort of prison life “is manifest in this study only in demonstrative

2

Serving a sentence in a prison where Antonio Gramsci—a political radical from the
generation before Negri—composed his Prison Notebooks, Negri’s theoretical
engagement with Gramsci is somewhat ambivalent given that Gramsci’s ontological
leanings are rooted in a pessimistic intellectual tradition.
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and expository concreteness” (xxii). Even in these opening passages, he presents us
with a tension that permeates and reshapes the affirmative.
Negri’s engagement with Deleuze began with his work on Spinoza; this
encounter, for Negri, would not be productive without tension. While Deleuze does not
deny the place of tension tout court, his emphasis is on the increase of our ability to act—
an organization of life enhancing encounters—and the concept of tension is of lesser
prominence especially with regards to how he mobilizes conatus. In contrast to Deleuze,
however, for Negri the affirmative is linked to the concept of antagonism, as a
constitutive quality of power. For Negri, “Spinoza’s is a philosophy of pure affirmation
that reproduces itself with increasing intensity at always more substantial levels of being”
(Savage Anomaly 47). Antagonism, while a seemingly negative concept, has a crucial
place in the affirmative for Negri. In order to understand this seeming contradiction,
which is central to the constitutive process, antagonism in relation to the positive must be
examined.
In a discussion that takes place in the notes on the very last pages of Savage
Anomaly, Negri both praises Deleuze for his understanding of the dimension of
singularity as well as the surface of Spinoza’s thought. However, this operation must be
amplified, according to Negri, in order to build a conception of singularity and surface
that develops into constructive and constitutive thought (267). While Deleuze points to
the Spinoza of the scholia, as the “second Spinoza” of the unfurled ethical arguments, in
Negri’s mind, Deleuze’s conception of this second Spinoza lands on the “terrain of
ethical science as such and in the field of grand moral rhetoric, rather than on the terrain
of a new apprehension of being” (267). Here, Negri pushes for a constitutive mechanism
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that allows the “construction of being into new spaces” (213) as opposed to arranging
encounters to intensify force. For Negri, Deleuze’s work does not come into full
possession of Spinozian power, as it does not engage in constituting what Negri calls the
multitude.
In Negri’s interpretation of Spinoza, substance is totality and totality is the
affirmation of the infinite presence of essence, which is cause of itself (49). Presence as
existence shifts the focus from essence. Existence, then, is indisputable, which is similar
to what we encounter with Deleuze, but existence seems to take on a different quality.
Negri is drawn to Deleuze’s configuration of immanence; however, for Negri, but not for
Deleuze, “every affirmation is a negation,” which is a function of the principle of power
(potentia). The ontological dynamism of power is the relationship between positivity and
negativity, which is a tension that organizes power within the spontaneity of being (50).
Importantly, the dynamic of totality indicates that the concept of power (potentia) is not
only an intensive property, as an essential principle of the “self-foundation of being”
(51), but also an extensive one, in that it articulates varying levels of reality (51).
Essence, still, is productive, as it is “cause and power (potentia)” (53). However, Negri,
unlike Deleuze, stresses the organization of the infinite, not in the arrangement of
productive encounters but as it corresponds to the modality of the causal mechanism, an
internal apparatus of supersession, which will take on a different dimension.

6. The Emergent Imagination
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In a chapter titled “Second Foundation” (144), Negri draws our attention to the
constitutive aspect of the affects. For him, the dynamic of potentia must be thought of in
terms of antagonism. Indeed, just as we noticed Deleuze’s fascination with the question
of what a body can do, we can detect in Negri his deep interest in the place of the
imagination as it relates to the construction of reality. Both Negri and Deleuze place the
affects at the heart of their interpretations of Spinoza’s work. As Genevieve Lloyd
explains, for Negri, it is through the imagination we gain entry into the realities of the
social world (62). That is, the imagination gives us access to reality, which is
contradictory and full of “fictions [that] are constitutive of the world of ordinary
experience” (63). The central point of her discussion is to contrast a rationalist
interpretation of Spinoza committed to the “supremacy of reason” over the affects with
Negri’s work that draws out the constitutive function of the affects by way of the
imagination. As Negri points out, “reason traverses the imagination, liberating the truth it
contains, and meanwhile the imagination constructs the passivity of the existent and,
therefore, of reason itself” (Savage Anomaly 106). Though fictions may not be adequate
ideas, Lloyd says “they are expressions of positive mental capacity, the capacity to feign”
(61). And feigning, as the act of the imagination, is a positive response to our own
limitations. Though the imagination is passive to a degree, feigning is a positive and,
thus, existent response of the imagination.
In the Ethics, Spinoza shows us that the single passions take the mind to greater
degrees of perfection (Ethics III P11S) and “[t]he Mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine
those things that increase or aid the Body’s power of acting” (III P12). Negri argues that
the imagination grants access to reality; it is a way of knowing. In contrast to Deleuze,
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Negri draws out the constitutive nature of the passions by way of the imagination.
Passing to greater levels of perfection is a chain that begins with a degree of power
insofar as we first can imagine our power of acting. Thus, the modality of the subject,
Negri highlights, is a genealogy of consciousness found within the Ethics. Material
consciousness—the materiality of the imagination—is a tendency or a striving toward
what we can do.
The consciousness, then, is a causal mechanism that is transformed into a
tendency. For Spinoza, the tendency begins with the imagination:
The Mind’s striving or power, is its very essence but the Mind’s essence
(as known through itself) affirms only what the Mind is and can do, not
what it is not and cannot do. So it strives to imagine only what affirms, or
posits, its power of acting. (IV P54 dem)
The striving as actual essence is the beginning of the constitution of the world. Thus,
striving, the endeavor to persevere in existence, is coupled with the imagination to affirm
things to come.
In a letter written by Spinoza to his friend Pieter Balling, Spinoza explains that
the imagination grants insight into the future as an omen.3 Balling had shared with
Spinoza that while his child was still healthy, he heard groans that he would hear later on
when his child was dying. Spinoza interprets the groans as the effects of the father’s
imagination, given that when Balling got up to check on his child and his rational mind
was specifically seeking out the sounds, the phenomenon was not distinct. Spinoza shares

3

See Spinoza, Letter 17, to Pieter Balling, 20 July 1664, in Curley (1985: 352-4).
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that this was not a case of illusions, but rather an omen, where the father gains access
through the imagination of the horrors to come.
In the example, reason, emotion, and imagination combine in the form of an
omen. The father loves his child so much, and this love and connection enables the father
to participate in the consequences of the child’s essence. The father gains access to the
future through the imagination, not through reason. In Lloyd's discussion of this
correspondence, the illusionary effects of the imagination combine as a positive force that
join together, “as illusion fostered by the materiality of the body and as positive insight
into truth” (65). It is, then, imagination, intellect, and emotion, rather than deductive
reason that promotes insight into the future.
In striving to affirm what the mind imagines, the essence is involved not only in
the spatial aspects or Deleuzian relational velocity of movement and rest but also with the
temporal dimension, or, rather, through the essence there is an overlap of both the spatial
and temporal dimensions of reality. The conatus, then, is found as “a permanently active
motor, a purely immanent causality” (Savage Anomaly 146), but the tendency, for Negri,
ensures that this force goes beyond the existent. Negri is interested in the tendency of
conatus as follows:
Conatus is the force of being, the actual essence of the thing, of indefinite
duration, and, at the same time, it is conscious of all this. Conatus is will
in reference to the mind, appetite in reference to the mind and body.
Desire is appetite with consciousness of itself… Modality is articulated by
means of the theory of conatus, proposing itself as power (potentia) that is
able to be passive to the same extent that it is able to be active, and
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therefore it presents itself as both affections gathered together in power.
(146)
Similar to Deleuze, the function of conatus is a force of being that is “subsumed in the
affections” (146). However, the mode is passive to the same extent that it is able to be
active—both gathered together in power, the nature of the modes present power, a power
that comes together in the affections by way of the imagination. Negri is positing
emergence amidst the passions through the imagination. For Negri, even from the initial
formulation, the conatus moves beyond, not as telos but rather as “emergent
consciousness” (146). Thus, we now see more clearly how through the passions the mind
strives to greater degrees of perfection, to increase the body’s power of acting through
imagining this power. Tension and antagonism are introduced as what we are not yet in
full possession of, as the imagination posits the power to act, albeit one that is still
indeterminate.
If we are to understand the constitutive power the affects possess, a more detailed
reading is necessary, as it is still unclear how the passions are constructive. Negri claims
that feelings of joy and sadness “appear as signals” (147) to understanding the
constitutive process. Similar to Deleuze, Negri argues that we strive toward that which
increases our power of action, and as such these signals come about in the tension
between joy and sadness. We affirm affections that posit our power of acting, even if this
power stems from passive and confused affections. This serves as the beginning of a
progression, where “perfection comes to constitute itself, as a tension within conatus’s
supersession of the existent” (147) and affects appear as signals in which we are able to
imagine an increase of our power of acting and move beyond immediate existence.
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This emergence is a fundamental point of the second foundation, as the
ontological dimension is posed as such: conatus is “the existential immediacy,” and it
“expresses the tension of essence in terms of tendency” (147). The moment of the tension
is also the moment of constitution, of existence. We have now come to acquire a process
that ascends, which is ontologically distinct from that of Deleuze. For Deleuze, the
affects are relational—determinate of reality in their composition—and horizontal. The
tendency of conatus is the affirmation of what increases our power of action— we strive
for what increases our power. Negri’s emphasis on the imagination is more than the
image encountered with Deleuze, which leaves a trace (as in affectio) in an existing
mode. The composition of the world—affecting and expressing—must for Negri move
beyond constant modal interplay. Negri builds on Deleuze’s plane of immanence by
accentuating the power of the passions as that which expands or ascends and imagination
as an opening into the future. It is through this internal operation that Negri begins to
achieve an ontological density. What we have yet to grasp fully, however, is the
normative function of the process of supersession of the existent as constitutive.
Through the complexity and power of the conatus a norm is produced. In what
follows, there are two distinct processes at play: “one that poses conatus as the dimension
of perfectibility and accumulates the elements of the progression, and another that
expresses the elements themselves as perfection” (148). This accumulation is not excess
but the supersession of the conatus. Conatus functions as a desire for what is good, but
the imagination allows for conatus to reach beyond immediate reality. Causality, then, as
the immanent force of perfection, is expressed as a tension in existence—a tension
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between what exists and what is to come, which drives conatus’s supersession of the
existent as the eventual expansion of being.
Conatus, for Deleuze, is a tendency to seek what is good—what increases our
power of acting—without ascension or emergence. In Negri’s analysis, the focus of the
conflicted nature of the affections does not end in a diminished ability to act, but rather is
constitutive in its own right. As such, the affirmation of conatus is directed at the tension,
at antagonism, as the expansion of being. The tension given in conatus “accumulates the
elements of that progression” (148), but in doing so it also expresses the elements
themselves as perfection. If Deleuze was interested in drawing out essence as existence,
Negri takes essence posed as existence and moves instead to “presence posing a
tendency” (148). Affirmation is aimed at the indeterminate, and the future is a tension at
the very heart of constitution.
With constitutive consciousness hinging on tension and antagonism, we must
keep in mind that this is a structural project, ontologically constituted by collective
praxis, and not to be thought of in dialectical terms (149). Though, at times, the analysis
will come close to the general scheme of the dialectic—using the force of the negative to
synthesize and create—Negri insists that it is without transcendental moments or
mediation. The dialectic works, not as a definitive form of thought but as “an articulation
of the ontological foundation, as a determination of existence and power: Spinoza’s
thought supersedes any possibility of transforming the dialectic into a generic key and
regards it instead as a direct organization of the conflict, as an elemental structure of
knowledge” (xxii). Thus, Negri asserts that constitutive thought carries the radical aspects
of negation but transforms it and puts it to use by grounding it in real being (xix). Tension
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and supersession should be seen as needs rather than ideals, and similarly, perfection is
ontological rather than utopian (228).
While it is true that Negri’s operation owes a debt to Deleuze's plane of
immanence, the terrain we move about on is quite different than the one coursed with
Deleuze. Negri retains the conception of surfaces and singularity, but he repurposes the
plane as a “plane of antagonism” (153). With Deleuze, what a body can do is affirmative
of immanence—of potentia; the construction of reality lies in what is already there—of
that which a body is already in full possession. In contrast, Negri points to a reality that
relies on the imagination: “Imagination extends the fundamental affects in time and
space… It begins to make the constitutive scheme complete. The fabric of the imaginary
stands out in its constitutive immediacy” (149, emphasis mine). For Negri, the imaginary
traverses time and space; the passions are a way into reality and the imagination emerges
and constitutes.

7. The Socialization of the Affects

Negri interprets Spinoza’s philosophy as one of pure affirmation, which
reproduces itself at always more substantial levels of being (47). However, reproduction
cannot involve mediation or transcendence. As such, at the level of the subject, the power
of potentia is the force of Being that drives the conatus as the force of each body, as each
being to the production of itself and the world (Subversive Spinoza 12). The conatus
couples with the imagination on the level of consciousness, but also must spread across
the social fabric in order to constitute the world.
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Imagining a thing impacts the mind with joy or sadness, which has an effect that
is independent of the actual thing imagined. Thus, we see how the affects are constitutive
of reality across the social sphere. We are affected at a constant, and as Spinoza writes,
“Any thing can be the accidental cause of Joy, Sadness, or Desire” (Ethics IV P15). Thus,
Negri conceives of the imagination as productive, even if, as far as consciousness is
concerned, the results are muddled. The imagination is hailed in terms of tension
produced, albeit confused, partial, and imbued with doubt (Savage Anomaly 149). The
affects create tension in the mind before they are lucid, adequate ideas. The tension
within the imagination, as seen in the Pieter Balling example, contains existence—it is a
participation in what exists. Spinoza describes the forward movement of confusion in this
way:
The uncertainty is a tension that pushes forward the constitutive function.
Constitution of the Mind which arises from two contrary affects is called a
vacillation of the mind, which is therefore related to the affect as doubt is
to the imagination; nor do vacillation of mind and doubt differ from one
another except in degree. (Ethics III P17S)
Vacillation of the mind, as Negri explains, is an uncertain but real power, and, moreover,
it is “a significant and effective elevation of the dynamism foreshadowed by Spinozian
physics” (Savage Anomaly 149). The elevation Negri speaks of begins with the
oscillation of the mind between affects. While at this point in the analysis, the oscillation
of the mind remains on the level of consciousness, for Negri, and in what is to follow, the
vacillation extends, as two contrary affects come together between people, which has a
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similar effect and allows him to show how desire is relational and constitutive across
the social realm.
The tension extends past the level of consciousness in order to conceive of the
socialization of the affects. In order to connect consciousness to the world, Negri
emphasizes part four of the Ethics, as the internal mechanics become quite complex and
the operation spreads to the social fabric. The supersession of the existent is at once a
tendency of the singular consciousness as well as a social desire, as Spinoza claims: “We
shall strive to do also whatever we imagine men to look on with Joy, and on the other
hand, we shall be averse to doing what we imagine men are averse to” (Ethics IV P29).
The vacillation of the mind highlights the constant tension of consciousness, and, as such,
“conatus is extended toward the interindividual and intrahuman dynamic” (Savage
Anomaly 150), which raises the dynamic to the entire social fabric. The passions and the
imagination create a fabric of constitutive immediacy; the tension dislocates “the physics
of elementary bodies onto the terrain of consciousness,” which is a dislocation to formed
individuals (151). Thus, Negri's ontological formation stratifies and reaches for a “higher
plane of being” (Savage Anomaly 151):
What begins to emerge clearly, then, is a mechanism of rationalization that
consists of the adequateness of reason to pass from one level of the
ontological composition to the next, each more complex than the last. But
a greater degree of ontological composition-complexity also means greater
dynamism and greater conflictiveness: The nexus of composition,
complexity, conflictiveness, and dynamism is a continual nexus of
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successive dislocations that are neither dialectical nor linear but rather,
discontinuous. (151)
When the affects are directed toward others, when the imagination is directed as
social desire, it is ever more expansive and constitutes “new affects, simply out of being
directed toward others” (151). If we think of the affects as signals, as consciousness, as
affective materiality then the stronger the affect is, the more productive it is. That is, the
strength of an affect allows a greater number of subjects to comprehend it because, as
Spinoza writes, “The Desire that arises from Sadness or Joy, and from Hatred or Love, is
greater, the greater the affect is” (Ethics IV P37). Desire coupled with the imagination
dislocates the physics, as the affects turn toward one another constituting new affects.
Uncovering greater levels of tension, Negri leads us through the pages of the Ethics
interpreting the productive and constitutive capacity of the affects. Spinoza shows us that
“[h]ate is increased by being returned but can be destroyed by Love” (IV P43). The
emphasis on love, for Negri, is key to constitutive desire, as it is a positive affect that
brings people together, which is key to the expansion of power for a formed body. In
composing the social dimension, Negri accentuates the productive capacity of the affects,
because they not only allow us to imagine, but are also conflictive—love and hate,
sadness and joy—and expand across the social fabric.
In defining the productive nature of the affects in socialization, Negri returns to
the conception of the negative. The productive nature of the affects is destruction of sorts:
“Expansiveness is also destruction, but it is so in the growth and overabundance of the
vital process, in the continuous movement of self-definition toward higher levels of
being” (Savage Anomaly 152). Destruction, then, is expansive. Through this continuous
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movement, the terrain is marked by the power of the conatus as “the accumulation of
stimuli” (152), which pushes forward and emerges in antagonistic moments—a
destruction that pushes deeper into indeterminate life.
The terrain transforms, with the expansion of the affects and the tendency of
conatus as a “positive resolution of conflictiveness” (152). The plane of antagonism
strives toward the plane of sociability; thus, “antagonism becomes the key to greater
ontological perfection and greater ethical freedom” (153). This vital process of power
cannot be diminished, but keeps expanding with the power of antagonism, which, for
Negri, is life itself.

8. From Conatus to Cupiditas

Up until now, the differences between Deleuze’s and Negri’s reading of the
conatus have allowed us to see how the affirmative aspects of their projects differ. The
divergence in their interpretations of Spinoza manifests in both the deployment of
conatus and, specifically, Negri’s move from conatus to cupiditas—desire—which is
defined by Spinoza as “appetite with consciousness of appetite” (Ethics III P9). In Savage
Anomaly, Negri shows the physical conatus, which must be “transfigured in cupiditas as
appetite endowed with consciousness” (154). It is within the analysis of cupiditas that
Negri challenges the notion of dispersive forces of the purely metaphysical realm, which,
he believes, leaves Deleuze's operation ambivalent to human struggle of the historical
realm—the two must come together. Negri’s contention is against moral rhetoric of
dispersive forces that lacks the carnality and power of the human passions, which is seen
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historically as humans come together in formation against oppression. It seems that for
Negri, Deleuze’s focus on encounters between singularities runs a risk of producing
sameness, which is, by Negri’s understanding, a mediation of sorts.
Key to Negri's amplification of the Deleuzian concept of surfaces and Negri’s
plane of antagonism is cupiditas as “passion that is partially, but radically rational” (154).
Rationality, here, cannot be separated from the conditions of rationality in materiality,
which is not a focus on the relational aspects of the affects but rather the projection of
desire. Cupiditas, then, is the essence of man (154) as a human “synthesis of the physical
conatus and the potentia of the mind” (155). It is being that asserts itself over these
conditions and the constitutive movement; it emerges:
And even if we assume that in passing from the simple conatus to the
cupiditas, from the physical realm to the animal realm, a certain corrective
to dispersion, on the edge of displacement, is introduced, nonetheless it is
extremely difficult for us to grasp the possibility of bringing these
contradictory and complex mechanisms and processes to an internal unity.
The result again, in particular, is the difficulty of defining the concept of
the multitudo as a political subject. So it seems that the multitudo can be a
political subject only as an idea of reason or as a product of the
imagination. (Subversive Spinoza 43)
In Negri’s case, the concept of conatus ascends to cupiditas, as the vital tension—
cupiditas is the essence of being. The tendency, striving, or motor force of life is the
supersession beyond the existent as marked by cupiditas. Thus, for Negri, conatus, as
affirmation, physically manifests as a tendency, but then transfigures into tension,
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antagonistic constitution, and cupiditas as “an absolutely affirmative power”
(Subversive Spinoza 107)—as social desire—and as a full horizon exhibiting the power of
being. The significance of an emerging body, of stratification on the plane of antagonism,
becomes clear at the mention of multitudo. The metaphysics of power become an ethics,
in which the imagination and collective desire are constitutive (Savage Anomaly xv).
For Deleuze, the conatus is the tendency, as the affirmation of encounters that
increase our capacity for action. Susan Rudduck describes the conatus as a concept close
to Deleuze’s notion of becoming in that it is similar to “the necessity of things to change,
to expand and enhance potentia” (2595). Organizing encounters to maximize the capacity
for action, power intensifies, which highlights the relational power that allows for greater
intensity. In contrast, cupiditas draws out antagonism as emergence, as opposed to the
process of desire that moves toward becoming. The tension of the dynamic essence is
posed beyond the notion of becoming to formed being. Human passion and rationality is
the general human fabric—a social fabric that is constructed in the “imagination [as it]
extends the tension from essence to existence on a terrain that is as vast as can be and
decisively corporeal” (Savage Anomaly 160).
The horizon of the totality, or of being, is fullness, but it is also a limit. The
horizon is a full limit on which cupiditas attempts its transgression of the existent;
cupiditas constructs a new fullness (Savage Anomaly 155). The tension of cupiditas is
“full, real, and given” (156) and extends the actual growth of the human essence as a
“law of contraction and expansion of being in the tension of the spontaneity to define
itself as subject” (156). Cupiditas shows us the constitutive process—one that is integral
to the socialization of the affects—as one of “filling the fullness”; it is a process that
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constructs the development of what Negri calls the multitudo, which "is not
emanationistic, but singular in its every emergence” (155). Thus, the infinite action of the
human—imagining, acting, living—is contingency, which is the future, as it is the
indefinite of human praxis, as potentia, which integrates into the positive infinity (157).
The encounter that enhances our power is still central to the configuration, but Negri
argues, this composition must be arranged in difference.
The sequence from conatus to cupiditas emphasizes the antagonistic quality—the
antagonistic dynamics and relations—of existence. It is on the basis of antagonistic
difference that singularity comes into being qua singularity. It is existence rather than
essence that makes singularity singular: singularity “posits itself as such only to the
extent to which its existence involves antagonistic praxis” (In Praise of the Common
128). Thus, difference—vital to antagonism—is constructive potential, and, as such, there
can be no creation without antagonism. And this difference, for Negri, is not sufficiently
rendered in a field of forces, an intensification of power in the encounter, or when
considered in regards to motion and rest; constructive potential must be made incarnate.

9. Positive Limits

For Negri, the affirmative is the expansion of being, as saying “‘positively’ is the
same as saying ‘being’ or, rather saying the construction of being and the elimination of
the inexistent” (160). Here, Negri gives us the full limit on which cupiditas as desire
expands as affirmative force. Between fullness and emptiness, being and nonbeing, the
tension moves us toward a constructive fullness of being in “opposition to the
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metaphysical and ethical inconceivability of emptiness, nonbeing, and possibility”
(155). The limit is the expansion into indeterminate life—the limit is existence.
Cupiditas as desire is a social desire that arises from tension, the emergence of a
need. The social and material drive is traversed by consciousness:
The conscious content of cupiditas leaps forward, implicating the body
and constituting the possibility of virtue by means of a tension between
essence and existence, which is also a fullness and a unity of the body and
human reason. (165)
Being emerges through this tension; it expands, it destroys the emptiness through its
construction, as we affirm and project the horizon of freedom—absolute affirmation.
Affirmation is the limit of tensions—our capacity to successively and antagonistically
project into indeterminate life.
In spatial terms, movement—productive action—constitutes human life and
demonstrates an ethics of liberation, which is the perpetual movement of the limits (179).
Human praxis—constitutive praxis—commits to the limit and accumulates, which is
constitution; it is in constitutive praxis that we find the limit; it is a measure of the
relationship with existence (180). This is where existence recognizes essence only as
power—as the tension of supersession (180). “The idea of the limit is ontologically
consubstantial with that of supersession” (180). Expansion through cupiditas emerges
ontologically; it is an affirmative limit of human praxis that favors a being beyond
becoming—the productive imagination as an ethical power that projects an ethical being,
and as we imagine it we come to constitute it.
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In the translator’s forward to Savage Anomaly, Michael Hardt states that Negri
achieves an ontological density (xv). For Negri, Spinoza’s conception of power is more
than a dispersive constellation of forces or a plane of individual potentialities; Negri
emphasizes ontologically the political centrality of Spinoza’s metaphysical conception of
power in a collective dimension where a social subject—the multitude—manifests
common desires through common social activity (xv). Negri admits in his conversation
with Casarino that Deleuze’s work helped him to overcome political limitations he faced,
as it was Deleuze’s ability to give conceptual form to a group of potentialities that
allowed him to move through his theoretical impasse.4 Deleuze broke a structural
horizon, which allowed Negri to “constitute and define the historical horizon, namely,
that microscopic horizon of history which was crisscrossed by specific actions and
intentions” (In Praise of the Common 135). Deleuze brings about a conception of
immanence based on singularity; Negri’s project must make way for singularity and the
event to come to the fore; that is, “the discovery of the logic of collective action” where
the field of forces becomes a frame, a method where developing the power of cupiditas to
intelligence allows the constitutive process to thrust itself forward (Savage Anomaly 170).
Immanence is the condition for liberation, and ethics is “the science of the constitutive
relationship between limit and liberation” (177). Salvation and freedom are posed as a
positive horizon, as the collective striving of the multitude, which is the definition of their
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As Casarino explains, up until his encounter with Deleuze, Negri’s engagement with
workerism confined the definitions of force, tendency, and struggle within a given
prefiguration of the system. Actions, such a class action and emergent social groups, were
situated within a structure toward necessary teleology and, for Negri, these confines were
often juridical (In Praise of the Common 136).
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limits. Without antagonistic difference, the space encloses and creates hierarchy, as
domination of singularities.
In contrast, Deleuze’s idea of the limit relies on conatus as physical essence, as
each thing strives, which is an effort of a tendency but also a limit. Power (potentia)
tending toward a limit, “in terms of the most rudimentary infinitesimal calculus, the
polygon that multiplies its sides tends toward a limit, which is the curved line”
(“Spinoza”). When the angular line, “by dint of multiplying its sides” (“Spinoza”), tends
toward infinity, the tension toward the limit also implies the infinite. Here, it seems that
the tension of the limit echoes Negri's notion, but in a strictly metaphysical sense and in
terms of essence. Deleuze's ontology is material, as is Negri's, but Negri's is grounded in
politics, while Deleuze's is grounded in science, according to Scott Lash (“Life
(Vitalism)” 17).
In his lectures on Spinoza, Deleuze describes the limit, demonstrated at its
simplest level, as a limit that is “the outline [contours]”; for example, “a volume has
surfaces for its limits” or “a cube is limited by six squares” (“Spinoza”). Initially, we
think of this limit as the outline of form and power, as what I can do between the two
limits (“Spinoza”). Drawing from the Stoics, Deleuze shows that when one defines a
volume by its outlines, “what happens inside is no longer important” (“Spinoza”). We
must find a way to think of the outline, instead, as where the action stops—not where a
form stops:
Things are Bodies: bodies and not ideas. Things are bodies, that meant that
things are actions. The limit of something is the limit of its action and not
the outline of its figure. … You are walking in a dense forest, you’re
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afraid … little by little, the forest thins out, you are pleased. You reach a
spot and you say, ‘whew, here’s the edge’. The edge of the forest is a
limit. [Is] that the forest … defined by its outline? It’s a limit of what? Is it
a limit to the form of the forest? [No] It’s a limit to the action of the forest
… the forest that had so much power arrives at the limit of its power, it
can no longer lie over the terrain, it thins out … [T]his is not an outline …
we can’t even specify the precise moment at which there is no more forest.
There was a tendency, and this time the limit is not separable, a kind of
tension toward the limit. It’s a dynamic limit that is opposed to an outline
limit. The thing has no other limit than the limit of its power [puisaance]
or its action. The thing is thus power and not form. The forest is not
defined by a form: it is defined by a power: power to make the trees
continue up to the moment at which it can no longer do so. The only
question that I have to ask of the forest is: what is your power? That is to
say, how far will you go? (“Spinoza”)
The tension toward the limit is the productive act of belief. To return to our opening
discussion, belief in the world is the affirmation of potentia. The tension here is
affirmation of power, not in an antagonistic moment or toward collective constitution, but
rather the expansion of power. Deleuze is clear: a body or a mind is not defined by its
form, nor by its function, but by its affective capacity, which is “a maximum threshold
and a minimum threshold” (Practical Philosophy 124). We do not know what affections
we are capable of—what good or bad the body or mind can do in a given encounter. In
such relations, we come to know what combinations can “compound directly to form a
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new, more ‘extensive’ relation, or whether capacities can compound directly to
constitute a more ‘intense’ capacity or power” (126). For Deleuze, on the plane of
immanence, essence must exist, and the extent of that power is a process that can escape
capture. As such, there is no supplementary dimension, but rather affirmation of
“individuating affective states of an anonymous force” (128).
Both Deleuze and Negri recast Spinoza's substance as material, and the material is
the cause of the world, the first cause. However, it is how they conceive of the
metaphysical that differentiates their positions. Deleuze's notion of the plane of
immanence is eventually developed into the concept of the virtual, which generates the
actual through the process of actualization, which, according to Lash, is “both
metaphysical and physical for Deleuze” (“Capitalism and Society” 15). Lash points out
that substance is the generator of the modes, as a multiplicity of differences, where the
modes are actual, which is also where Spinoza's metaphysics approaches one of his
contemporary’s, Gottfried Leibniz; instead of Spinoza's emphasis on one substance,
Leibniz emphasizes extensive modality—“a first cause is the single substance of the
plane of immanence or difference-in-itself...it generates what Deleuze calls differencefor-itself” (16). For Negri, the plane of immanence provides the necessary conditions for
constitutive praxis; the plane of immanence is the plane of antagonism striving toward
the plane of sociability. The passions and affects of the political are ontologically dense;
this density marked by cupiditas is carnal in that it is “dripping [with the] historicity” of
struggle (In Praise of the Common 208). Singularities, in either case, are generative,
whether collective or singular. This point, too, is quite crucial, as the assertion of this
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essay indicates an ontological difference between Deleuze and Negri based on their
respective interpretations of the internal apparatus of immanence.
What is central and indeed has been building in this analysis is the ontological
space that both operations occupy. For Deleuze, the positive limit of power echoes the
Spinozian expression of what a body can do—how far will you go. The expression itself
emphasizes a body, the singular. The ontological distinction of Negri’s collective
singularities or multitude is a positive limit of the political, which is more than a
metaphysical horizon, but a quality of the mode of human action (Savage Anomaly 169).
Though with a distinct internal apparatus on the level of immanence, the positive limit of
power, for either Negri or Deleuze, is generative—it creates or expands.
Perhaps a productive way to think of positive limits may come from the thrust of
potentialities toward transformation. In Empire, Hardt and Negri consider the poor, who
are destitute, excluded, and repressed, as the very possibility of the world, as it is “here in
this world, in the existence of the poor, [that] the field of immanence is presented,
confirmed, consolidated, and opened” (157). Though the poor are subjugated and
exploited, they are also a figure of production, of potentia.
Hardt and Negri evoke the imagery of the poor through Vittorio De Sica and
Cesare Zavattini’s film Miracle in Milan (1951), as a story of the vagrant poor of Italy in
the 1950s who, in the very end of the film, restore a sense of belief in the world as the
poor steal the brooms from the street workers and fly away on stolen broomsticks. Hardt
and Negri link the poor of Miracle in Milan to that of life, “a liberated life and a liberated
productivity” (159). The poor are free in that they are free from the means of
production—unlike the street workers—with nothing but their own labor power. The
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poor of De Sica’s film illustrate what Negri examines in Savage Anamoly, as the poor
are the critical being, the conflictual being, the antagonistic being that becomes key to
both greater ontological perfection and greater ethical freedom: “The power [of the poor]
developed here are never flattened or diminished but, rather, are stimulated to grow and
expand” (Savage Anomaly 153). The film depicts a “multitude” of those who are brought
together through their suffering but who are productive through their hope—imagining
their power and so acting it. As the poor take flight, the image of the exodus in Miracle in
Milan emphasizes a belief in the world over where they might land—the act of freedom
is the transformation. The positive limit of “how far might you go” (“Spinoza”) is, for the
poor of Miracle in Milan, a flight into the sky.
Deleuze holds that our ethical task is “[to] do all we can” (Expressionism in
Philosophy 269). In the end, we might consider the ethics of the encounter between
Spinoza, Deleuze, and Negri, as encounters that precipitated new events. These
encounters were not of fidelity, but rather a push toward the positive limits of life—of the
work of a life, a productive engagement, a typology of immanent modes—restoring a
belief in the world and with it a productive imagination.
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